



## Laws Pertaining to Kibbud Av Va'Em (3)

### Topics discussed in this week's shiur:

**1) If the mitzvah of Kibbud av va'em is a ben adam le'chavero or ben adam la'Makom. 2) Asking forgiveness from one's parents. 3) Admitting that one did not respect his parents. 4) Having kavanah for the mitzvah. 5) Having kavanah in an unclean place. 6) Respecting one's parents in one's thoughts. 7) Standing for a parent who is blind. 8) Obligation of a person who is blind to stand for a parent. 9) Honoring one's parents when they do not have direct benefit. 10) Changing one's minhagim.**

### Ben Adam le'chavero or ben adam la'Makom

The *Ramban* (*Shemot* 20:12) states that the *Aseret Hadibrot* consisted of two parts; five mitzvot on one of the *luchot* and five on the other one of the *luchot*. One of the *luchot* consisted of mitzvot that are *ben adam la'Makom* – between man and God (Believing that Hashem took us out of Egypt, not worshipping other gods, keeping Shabbat, not using Hashem's Name in vain, and honoring one's parents), and the other consisted of the mitzvot of *ben adam le'chavero* – between man and man (Don't kill, don't steal, do not commit adultery, do not covet one's neighbor, do not testify as a false witness). The *Ramban* says that from here we clearly see that the mitzvah of *Kibbud av va'em* is primarily a mitzvah of *ben adam la'Makom*.

The *Rambam* (in his commentary to *Mishnayot, Pe'ah* 1:1) on the other hand, understands that this mitzvah is a mitzvah that is *ben adam le'chavero*. He explains that the first *Mishnah* in *Masechet Pe'ah* says: "The following are things that a person who performs them benefits of their fruits in this world, yet the principal remains intact for him in the World to Come, and they are: Honoring one's father and mother; bestowing kindness; visiting the sick; hospitality to guests etc...." All of the mitzvot that are mentioned in the *Mishnah* are rewarded in this world and in the World to Come because these mitzvot benefit people in this world, and as a result, Hashem gives a person an equal reward both in this world and in *Olam Habbah*. Meaning to say, that all of the mitzvot that mentioned in the *Mishnah* are mitzvot that are *ben adam le'chavero*.

There are many poskim on each side of this argument, and since the *Shulchan Aruch* does not issue any ruling on this matter, we must assume the stringent opinion in any given case.

I mentioned last week that I have found fourteen practical applications that result from this debate. I have already mentioned a few, and I will quickly review them and we will mention more applications as well:

### 1. Asking forgiveness from one's parents:

Doing *teshuvah* and praying on Yom Kippur suffices to atone for sins that one has done that are *ben adam la'Makom*, but sins that are *ben adam le'chavero* are only atoned for if one asks forgiveness from the person that he has slighted. According to the *Rambam* the boy needs to ask them forgiveness from his parents since it is a mitzvah of *ben adam le'chavero*, and not just *ben adam la'Makom*. However, according to the *Ramban*, he fulfills his *teshuvah* through expressing his regret during the recitation of *vidduy*, since it is a mitzvah that is *ben adam la'Makom*.

### 2. Admitting that one disrespected his parent:

The *Rambam* (*Hilchot Teshuvah* 2:5) says: "It is very praiseworthy for a person who repents to confess in public and to make his sins known to others... Anyone who, out of pride, conceals his sins and does not reveal them will not achieve complete repentance... However, in regard to sins between man and God, it is not necessary to publicize one's transgressions... In public, he should only make a general confession. Therefore, one should act stringently and not speak publicly about the times that he disrespected his parent, since according to the *Ramban* it is a mitzvah of *ben adam la'Makom*."

### 3. Having intention to fulfill a mitzvah:

If the mitzvah of *Kibbud av va'em* is a mitzvah that is *ben adam la'Makom*, then a person should have specific intention to fulfill a mitzvah upon serving his parent, as one would do when doing other mitzvot that require *kavanah*. However, *Shivat Tzion* (*Derush* 10, 16:4, by the son of the *Nodeh BeYehudah*) says that one does not need any specific *kavanah* when doing a mitzvah that is *ben adam le'chavero*, since the mitzvah is dependent on the result of the mitzvah being done.

This is the point where we got up to last week. Other applications of this include:

### 1. Having kavanah for the mitzvah in an unclean place:

If one is passing by an unclean place, such as past a smelly garbage

or sewer, if we say that the mitzvah of *Kibud av va'em* is a mitzvah that is *ben adam la'Makom* then one must have *kavanah* that he is fulfilling a mitzvah, and *Maran zt"l* writes in *Yabia Omer* (vol. 6, Y.D. 29) and *Teshuvot Chazon Ovadia* (29:8) that one is not permitted to have *kavanah* for a mitzvah in a place that is unclean. But, if we say that the mitzvah of *Kibud av va'em* is a mitzvah that is *ben adam le'chavero*, then a person is permitted to perform such a mitzvah in an unclean place. This would be similar to giving *tzedakah*, where the mitzvah is dependent on the poor person receiving the money and benefitting, and one's intentions when fulfilling the mitzvah are irrelevant.

I recall that when I was only a child I would see *Maran zt"l* be so immersed in his learning that my mother had to call several times to come and eat the food that she had prepared for him. After the food had cooled off and she had rewarmed it (which was not such a simple ordeal back then), she would shut off the lights in the house so that *Maran zt"l* would stop learning and take a break to eat his food.

*Maran zt"l* would ask me to bring him the *Hamodia* (a religious newspaper) that he could read in the restroom since he always so immersed in his learning he would not be able to stop himself from thinking about his learning even in the bathroom, so he had to distract himself with something else.

## 2. Honoring one's parents even in one's thoughts:

*Sefer HaCharedim* (9:35) states that the obligation of honoring one's parents is even in one's heart. Meaning to say, that a person may not even think negative thoughts about his parents. He even says that one who even thinks about belittling his parents is included in the words (*Devarim* 27:16) "Accursed is the one who degrades his father and mother." This is also brought by *Chayeh Adam* (67:1) and *Chida* (*Shiyurei Berachah* 241). It seems though that this reasoning only applies if this mitzvah is a mitzvah of *ben adam la'Makom*, since Hashem knows what one's true intentions are, but not if this is mitzvah that is *ben adam le'chavero*. Nevertheless, even if it is *ben adam le'chavero*, one should still not have negative thoughts since one's thought can also affect one's actions.

Interestingly, the *Shulchan Aruch* (Y.D. 241:6) does not bring this halachah, and it seems to me that the reason for this is that if a person sees his father acting in a disgusting way it is not fair to be commanded to not think badly of such actions, since people can only be in control of their thoughts to an extent. Nevertheless, a person should be stringent when he can and avoid thinking negatively about his parents.

## 3. Standing for a parent who is blind:

If we say that the mitzvah of *Kibud av va'em* is a mitzvah that is *ben adam la'Makom*, then one should be obligated to stand for his parent even if the parent is blind and does not see that one is standing for the parent's honor. But, if we say that the mitzvah is *ben adam le'chavero*, then one should not be obligated to stand for a parent who is blind since the parent cannot get the satisfaction in knowing that his child is standing in his honor.

*Shaar Ephraim*<sup>1</sup> (*siman* 78) discusses this question, and he brings a

<sup>1</sup> By Rabbi Ephraim ben Yaakov haCohen. He was born in Vilna in 1616, and was the disciple of R. Moses Lima, author of the *Chelkat Mechokek*, on the *Shulchan Aruch*, and was a colleague of R. Shabtai Cohen, author of the *Shach*. At the age of twenty he was appointed a judge in his city, and afterwards served as rabbi of various communities, his last position in Obin, Hungary (Obuda, today: Budapest), where he established a yeshivah. Unfortunately, he passed away during a plague in 1678 while preparing to immigrate to Eretz Yisrael.

proof from the *Gemara*, *Yoma* 53a, that says that when Rava would walk backwards when leaving the room after learning with Rav Yosef, even though Rav Yosef was blind. The *Gemara* states that people would bless Rava that he should be honored by the entire city, as a reward for honoring Rav Yosef in such a manner. It seems from here that there is an obligation to honor one's rebbe even though he is blind. However, it is possible that the reason why the *Gemara* mentions that Rava was blessed for doing so is because Rava did this as a matter of stringency and not because he was required to do so. *Sfat Emet* (*Yoma* 53b) even says that it is possible that at that point Rav Yosef was not yet blind.

*Rashi* (*Bereshit* 37:34) says that Yaakov Avinu was punished that he mourned over the disappearance of Yosef for 22 years corresponding to the 22 years that he was away from his father's home and did not honor his father Yitzchak. This was the case even though Yitzchak was blind, and we see from here that there is a mitzvah to honor even a parent who is blind. Even if one would deflect this proof and say that Yaakov was punished for not honoring Yitzchak in all of the other ways of honoring a parent (other than just standing for him), one is nevertheless obligated to stand for a blind parent because other people might not know that one's parent is blind and will otherwise think that one is not respecting his parent.

The *Minchat Chinuch* (*Mitzvah* 257) also discusses whether a person must stand for a person who is blind and elderly.

*Teshuvot HaLeKet* (1:154, by Rabbi Yaakov Chagiz – who lived about 350 years ago) brings a proof from the *Gemara*, *Kiddushin* 33b, that when Abayah was able to see the ear of the donkey that Rav Yosef was riding on, he would immediately stand in honor of Rav Yosef, even though Rav Yosef was blind.<sup>2</sup>

The *Chida* (*Birkei Yosef* 242:2 and 244:11) and *Ginat Veradim* (Y.D. 4:2) rule that one is obligated to stand for a parent or a *Talmid chacham* who is blind. Even though the *Perach Shushan* (Y.D. 4:1) argues and states that one is not obligated to stand for a regular *Talmid chacham*, he also admits that one is obligated to stand for someone who is considered one's primary rabbi (*rebbe muvhak*). This is also the ruling of the *Teshuvah Me'Ahavah* (*siman* 375); Rabbi Akiva Eiger; *Gedolot Elisha* (Dangur, 244:7); and *Ben Ish Chai* (*Ki Tetze* 2:15). The *Chazon Ish* (151:1) adds that a son must stand for his parent, even though the parent is blind, since part of the mitzvah of honoring one's parent is that the parent knows that when he enters the room his son is standing for him, even if he doesn't see it for himself, the mere knowledge that he knows that his son honors him suffices.

Therefore, in conclusion, it seems to me that a person must stand in the honor of his parent even if one's parent is blind.

## 4. The obligation of Kibud av va'em for a person who is blind:

<sup>2</sup> The *Shelah* (*Shaar HaOtiyot*, 100, p. 69b) brings the *Gemara* (*Berachot* 61a and *Eruvin* 18b) that states that a man is not permitted to walk behind a woman, and that it is better to walk behind a lion than walk behind a woman, since walking behind a woman can lead a person to have inappropriate thoughts. The *Shelah* adds that it is not permitted even for a blind man to walk behind a woman and this is not something that is entirely dependent on one's thoughts. Even so, the *LeKet Yosher* (Y.D. p. 37, by the author of the *Terumat haDeshen*) states that people are not particular about this halachah anymore, and that if there is no other place to walk, then it is permitted to walk behind a woman if one averts his gaze from her. *Sefer Chassidim* (393 and 1120) says that the *berachah* of "*She'hasimcha bim'ono*" should not be recited during a *sheva berachot* meal in a place where there are men and women sitting in together. However, *Yabia Omer* (vol. 3, E.H. 10:9 and vol. 6, O.C. 13:5) writes that it is permitted nowadays even if they are in the same room, and this is especially true if it is family function.

In the opposite case, where a person is blind, and the parents are not, since a blind person is exempt from many mitzvot, he should also be exempt from having to stand for his parent. Nevertheless, the *Gemara, Kiddushin* 31b, states that when Rav Yosef (who was blind) would hear the footsteps of his mother, he would say "Let us stand for the honor of the *Shechina*." *Sdei Chemed* (vol. 5, p. 211) points out though that this *Gemara* is not necessarily proof that a blind person is obligated to stand for his parent, since it is possible that Rav Yosef was only stringent upon himself to do so.<sup>3</sup> In general, the *Gemara, Kiddushin* 32b, states that a person must stand for an elderly person when the person comes within one's four *amot* radius, and one must stand for a parent or *rebbe muvhak* (one's primary rabbi) when he sees him from a distance "as far as the eye can see," which is calculated to being a distance of 128 meters. In the case where the person is blind, since he cannot fulfill this halachah, since at that distance there is no way for him to know that his parent is within view, even upon standing upon hearing the parent's footsteps when he comes closer, it is not readily apparent that the blind son is standing in honor of his parent. As an onlooker could just assume that since he didn't stand for the parent when he was within view and only stood later, he must be standing for some other reason and not necessarily to honor his parent.

*Pitchei Teshuvah* (Y.D. 240:7) rules that a blind person is obligated in the mitzvah of *Kibud av va'em* but he is not obligated to stand for his parent. However, *Minchat Chinuch* (mitzvah 227), *Gedolot Elisha* (ibid.), *Ben Ish Chai* (ibid.), and the *Chazon Ish* (151:1) all rule that he is obligated to stand if he is aware that the parent has walked into the room or is within view.

## 5. Honoring one's parents when they do not have direct benefit:

When a parent does not have any benefit from what he is asking his child to do, the child is not obligated to listen to him. For example, if one wants to buy a new home, and the parent is against him buying the home because he feels that it doesn't have enough windows, one does not have to listen to the parent, since such an issue does not affect the parent in any way whatsoever. It is possible though, that one only does not have to listen if we say that this is a mitzvah that is *ben adam la'Makom*, since this is not one of the obligations that a son has when honoring his parent, since it is not included in helping him in or out, giving him clothing, or giving him food and drink (as stated in the *Gemara, Kiddushin* 31b). Whereas if we say that it is a mitzvah that is *ben adam le'chavero*, then since the parent will be upset if the son does not listen to his advice, one should listen to the parent even though the parent has no direct benefit. For this reason, the *Meiri* (*Yevamot* 5b), *Teshuvot HaRosh* (15:5), and *Rabbenu Yerocham* (1:4) state that one must listen to his parent even in a case where the parent is not receiving direct benefit, since the parent brought a person into this world, one has an obligation out of *hakarot hatov* to listen to his parent.

However, according to *Rashba, Ramban* and *Ritva* (*Yevamot* 6a), one does not have to listen to a parent if there is no direct benefit to the parent. As we have mentioned above, the *Ramban* is of the opinion that the mitzvah of *Kibud av va'em* is a mitzvah that is *ben adam la'Makom*.

*Yabia Omer* (vol. 8, Y.D. 28) and in *Maor Yisrael* (*Pesachim* 104b) rules that one only has to listen to his parent if it is something that is directly related to the parent, and not for something that has no direct benefit.

*Yabia Omer* also brings the *Maharik* (*Shoresh* 166, by Rabbi Yosef Kolon, who lived 550 years ago) who was asked about a person who swore to his father that he would not get married without first asking permission from his father, and in exchange for this the father agreed to travel to far-away place on behalf of his son. However, beforehand the son had said in front of two witnesses that he did not really intend on keeping his promise. After some time, the son had met a girl that he felt was an appropriate match for him and he was *mekadesh* her, but had not yet done *Nissuin* (as it was customary back then to perform the *Kiddushin* and *Nissuin* separately). The father found out about his son's bride, and he was very disturbed because the girl was from a different community than his own, and he commanded his son to divorce her and not perform *Nissuin*.

The *Maharik* ruled that the boy does not have to listen to his father since he is not obligated to listen to a parent's request if it is not directly related to the parent and is included in the mitzvah of *Kavod*, such as giving the parent food or clothing.

Obviously, if a parent tells his son not to marry a girl because she is immodest or acts immodestly then the child should listen to his parent.

Unfortunately, some parents decide that it is justified to call off a good *shidduch* for ridiculous reasons. I remember when we were living on *Rechov Elkana*, there was a certain Rabbi who had worked for the army who became acquainted with the daughter of a prominent Ashkenazic *dayan*, and they eventually became engaged and were set to get married. The *dayan* was adamantly against the *shidduch*, and would state that "he didn't survive the Holocaust so that his daughter should get married to a Sephardi..." and he refused to even attend the wedding! The *chattan* came to our house and asked *Maran zt"l* for his advice, since he didn't know what was the right thing for him to do. *Maran zt"l* confidently told him that he should not cancel the wedding, and he has nothing to fear, especially because the halachah is that the girl does not need to listen to her father in this instance, since this is something that is not directly related to him. He then told the *chattan* that even so, he should try to send people to his future father-in-law to appease him anyways.

On the day of the wedding, *Maran zt"l* was asked to be the *mesader kiddushin*, and on his way he told his driver to stop at the home of this *dayan*. *Maran zt"l* got out of the car and knocked on the door, the *dayan* answered and *Maran zt"l* began to plead with him to get himself and his wife ready so that they could come with him to the wedding of their daughter. After some prodding, *Maran zt"l* convinced them to join him, and they peacefully attended the *chatunah*.

Years later, this *dayan* approached *Maran zt"l* and thanked him for all that he did for him, and he exclaimed, "I now have many different sons-in-law, but the Sephardic one is by far my favorite one!"

The *Gemara, Pesachim* 104b, brings that Ullah, who was the *Gadol haDor*, had come to visit the city of Pumpadita, and upon hearing this, Rav Yehudah asked his son, Rav Yitzchak, to bring Ullah a basket of fruits, and also observe how Ullah performs Havdalah, this way, he would be able to know the halachah on how the proper way to recite Havdalah is. Rav Yitzchak did not heed to his fathers' request, and did not personally go, rather, he sent Abayah to go to Ullah instead, and Abayah returned and explained to them how Ullah had performed Havdalah. Rav Yehudah then admonished Rav Yitzchak for not personally going to Ullah, and stated that from then on the halachah would be said in the name of Abayah, and Rav Yitzchak had lost out on the opportunity to have the halachah stated in his name.

It seems from this *Gemara* that Rav Yehudah did not admonish Rav

<sup>3</sup> See *Yalkut Yosef*, vol. 1, p. 84, that discusses if a blind person is obligated in mitzvot, and the conclusion is that he is indeed obligated in the mitzvot that he can fulfill.

Yitzchak for not fulfilling the mitzvah of *Kibud av va'em*, since the fact that he wanted Rav Yitzchak to go personally is not something that was a direct benefit to Rav Yehudah, since his primary request was that he should find out how Ullah performs Havdalah.

It is possible to say that this is not such a great proof to this halachah, since according to the *Sdei Chemed (Ma'aerechet Mem, Klall 54)* a person is able to appoint a proxy for any mitzvah, and it is considered as if the person personally did the mitzvah as well, but he just does not get as much reward for doing the mitzvah had he done it personally.<sup>4</sup>

## 6. When a father tells his son to change his minhag:

A Sephardic boy who is learning in an Ashkenaz yeshivah should not change his minhag even though he father requests that he should. Some people think that there are no Sephardic *gedolim*. Unfortunately, they are not familiar with the wealth of Gedolim that we have, such as the *Chikrei Lev, Chida, Ma'mar Mordechai*, Rabbi Chaim Palagi, Rabbi Yaakov Faragi, *Kenesset HaGedolah, Ginat Veradim*, and many more.... One does not have to listen to his father if his father says that he must go to an Ashkenaz Yeshivah either. *Baruch Hashem*, there are many very good Sephardic yeshivot, and one should continue with his *minhagim* and *mesorah*.

Likewise, if one's father tell him to go to a yeshivah that is also spends their day studying secular subjects, the son does not have to listen to his father, and he should attend a yeshivah that focuses only on Torah.

When I entered the Rabbanut, one of the Kenesset members, Tzivi Livni, wanted to establish a new law that required yeshivot to learn secular studies as well, and she asked me to help her convince Chacham Shalom Cohen to accept this law and institute it in the yeshivot. I told her, "I have a surprise for you. Did you know that I do not have a high school diploma?" She was shocked, "What?! You never got a diploma!?" "No," I replied, "I finished learning secular subjects at sixth grade, and from then on I only learned Torah, and look at where it got me!"

I commonly receive requests from boys who ask me to send a letter

<sup>4</sup> When learning these concepts in depth, it is amazing to observe the number of proofs, deflections, and depth that the poskim present. When learning any concept it is very important to see all of the possible angles, and think about every possibility that can be entertained. *Maran zt"l* was very adamant that people should not learn by themselves, and it is important to speak with other people about one's learning. I have even seen people who have written sefarim, and you can see that they had not considered to speak to others about their ideas before presenting them in the book. When a person does not learn with a *chavrutah*, he forfeits on his depth of his understanding.

For example, *Yabia Omer* (vol. 9, O.C. 38) discusses the halachah of answering amen to a *berachah* on Hallel on *Rosh Chodesh*. According to the *Rambam (Berachot 11:16)* and the *Shulchan Aruch (422:2)* such a *berachah* is considered a *berachah levatalah*. Whereas, according to *Rabbenu Tam (Tosafot, Berachot 14a; Sukkah 44b)* and the *Rama*, one should recite a *berachah*. The *Yabia Omer* concludes that since according to the *Shulchan Aruch* this is a *berachah levatalah*, a Sephardi should not answer amen when hearing an Ashkenazi recite this *berachah*.

I then saw in this *sefer* (that I described above, who learned without a *chavrutah*), that he argues on *Maran zt"l*, and asks that since we know that a woman is permitted to answer amen to the *berachah* that is recited on the mitzvah of shofar or when she hears a man recite a *berachah* upon shaking the *Arba Minim*, so too, one should be allowed to answer amen to the *berachah* of an Ashkenazi on Hallel.

What kind of question is this?! A person is certainly entitled to argue on *Maran zt"l*, but he must do so with wisdom! There is an obvious difference between the two cases. In the case of a woman, she is permitted to answer amen to the *berachah* on shofar even though she is not obligated in the mitzvah, since the man who is blowing the shofar is indeed obligated in the mitzvah and everyone agrees that the *berachah* that he is saying is not considered a *berachah levatalah*. Whereas in the case of Hallel, since according to the *Shulchan Aruch*, the person who is reciting the *berachah* on Hallel is reciting a *berachah levatalah*, one should not answer amen.

I showed this *sefer* to *Maran zt"l*, and *Maran zt"l* exclaimed, "This is a disproof?! This person must have only written this because he never learned with a *chavrutah*! If he would have had someone to learn with him, he would have been set straight and realized his mistake!"

*Maran zt"l* had told me many times that there was not a *teshuvah* in *Yabia Omer* that he did not consult with the *Gedolei haDor* before publishing it. He either went to Rabbi Ezra Attia, Rabbi Tzvi Pesach Frank, Rabbi Gershon Lapidot, or the Rav of Teflik, or Rabbi Pinchas Epstein. There were many times where he would go to Chacham Ben Tzion Abba Shaul's home and discuss different Torah topics with him as well.

to their parents and convince them to send them to yeshivah and not to a secular school. There was a Rosh HaYeshivah of a certain *Hezder Yeshivah* who had students that wanted to continue in the regular Yeshivah system, and he asked me to write a letter to *Maran zt"l* for the boys, and when I showed the letter to *Maran zt"l*, he immediately would sign it and give his blessings, and I would then bring the letter back to the Rosh hayeshivah and he was then able to send the boys to Yeshivah.

When *Maran zt"l* was the Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, I had a chavruta that would come to the home and learn with me during *ben hazmanim*. This boy would wear a kippah *seruga*, which is normally worn by the more Zionistic Israeli's. *Maran zt"l* quietly expressed his concern to me that he was afraid that I would be influenced by the Zionistic mode of thought by learning with this boy. I reassured him though that the boy was not truly Zionist, as he would only wear that kippah in honor of his father who was a Holocaust survivor, and his father was adamant that he wore such a kippah. Many years later, this boy is now an outstanding *charedi talmid chacham* and has written many book on the laws of Shabbat. What I took out of this story was that *Maran zt"l* was very concerned about others influencing his children and was adamant that his children should remain in yeshivah and learn Torah.

This past week I saw in a certain newsletter that a "Rabbi Dr." wrote an article that the only way a person can become a valid convert is if he also serves in the Israeli Army. I would not believe it if I didn't see it for myself! Where did this person get these ideas from?! A person who learns Torah protects the entire generation. The *Midrash (Bamidbar Rabba, 22:2; Tanchumah, Matot 3; Yalkut Shimoni, Bamidbar 31:3)* states that for every thousand people that *David haMelech* sent to war, he would also have a thousand people learning and praying in the Bet Hamidrash. The people who are sitting and learning Torah are the ones who protect the people who go to war!

The *Chida (Keshet Gudal 12:9)* brings in the name of the *Arizal* that there are 12 gates in *Shamayim* that the *teffilot* pass through, each *nussach* has their own gate, but the *teffilot* of Sepharadim pass through all 12 gates!

We see from here the importance of being steadfast in keeping our *minhagim*, and anyone who discontinues our *minhagim* is considered like he is degrading the previous generations. Chacham Ezra Attia used to say that bachurim who untuck their *tzitzit* is considered like they are degrading the Chachamim of the previous generations, since one is not abiding by the Sephardic custom. All of the Sephardic *Gedolim*, including Rabbi Ovadia Hedayah, Rabbi Yaakov Adess, Rabbi Avraham Entebbi, Rabbi Ben Tzion Abba Shaul, and *Maran zt"l*, would all tuck in their *tzitzit*, and would not have them hanging outside of their pants. Yaskil Avdi (vol. 5, O.C. 3) explains that this was done for Kabbalistic reasons. Anyone who tells one otherwise is incorrect, and one should not be embarrassed to keep his *minhagim*.

If a person is living in a place where there are many non-religious people, or if he is in an Ashkenaz yeshivah and feels embarrassed about appearing different than all of his friends, then *Maran zt"l* ruled that he is permitted to keep his *tzitzit* untucked, but once he gets married and is independent, he should revert back to the original Sephardic custom and tuck his *tzitzit* in.